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OIL DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR: THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S 
STATUTORY MANDATE 
Trisna Tanus 
 
Abstract: The potential for oil production in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge (ANWR) coastal plain, otherwise known as the 1002 Area, is significant, 
with a current value of $770 billion. Yet, there are considerable knowledge gaps 
and disagreements over the environmental impacts of oil development in ANWR. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) manages ANWR and is tasked with 
advancing the refuge’s mission of ecological conservation. Before it can approve 
oil development in ANWR, the FWS is statutorily required to ensure that oil 
development is compatible with ANWR’s mission. This Comment argues that the 
precautionary principle is embedded within the laws governing FWS 
management of ANWR. Simply, the precautionary principle is “foresight 
planning,” in that it demands proactive prevention of potentially serious threats 
to human health and the environment. Therefore, until sufficient scientific 
information demonstrates oil development is compatible with ecological 
conservation, the FWS must proceed with caution and prohibit oil development 
in ANWR’s 1002 Area. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate over whether to drill for oil in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) provokes fierce ethical, 
moral and political passions.1 In recent years, this debate has 
                                                        
1. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1370, AN EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE 
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intensified as a result of significant increases in gasoline prices 
and continuing instability in oil-rich countries of the Middle 
East.2 The total amount of oil available in ANWR is 
considerable. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates 
that the mean technically recoverable oil in ANWR is 7.7 
billion barrels.3 As a comparison, the United States currently 
uses approximately 7.0 billion barrels per year.4 With oil prices 
currently at $100 per barrel and increasing, oil development in 
ANWR will likely yield much more than $770 billion.5  
In sharp contrast to ANWR’s great potential for oil 
production, ANWR is the largest national wildlife refuge in 
this country and accounts for 19.3 million acres in the Alaska 
North Slope region.6 Home to an astounding abundance of 
plant and animal life, this refuge includes calving grounds of 
the porcupine caribou, migration paths of tens of thousands of 
birds and insects, snow dens and birthing places of threatened 
polar bears, and all-year activities of sheep, oxen, and 
wolves.7 For instance, the porcupine caribou herd, numbered at 
129,000, moves annually from south of the Brooks Range in 
the Arctic Refuge and Canada to give birth to their young on 
the arctic coastal region.8 
                                                        
NEEDS TO INFORM DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE CHUKCHI AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA 1 (Leslie Holland-Bartels & Brenda 
Pierce eds., 2011) [hereinafter U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY]. 
2. M. LYNNE CORN, MICHAEL RATNER & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR): A PRIMER FOR THE 
112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/167865.pdf [hereinafter CRS PRIMER]. The 
CRS issued an updated version of this report in 2012. The 2012 report is largely 
similar to the report on which this Comment relied. Due to differences in pagination, 
this Comment cites the 2011 report. The 2012 report can be found online. M. LYNNE 
CORN, MICHAEL RATNER & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR): A PRIMER FOR THE 112TH 
CONGRESS (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33872.pdf. 
3. Id. There is a possibility that economically recoverable oil is as much as 10.7 
billion barrels. 
4. Id. 
5. Mia Bennett, After Years of Waiting, Shell Oil Drillships Poised to Explore Arctic 
Alaska, ALASKA DISPATCH, June 2, 2012, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/after-
years-waiting-shell-oil-drillships-poised-explore-arctic-alaska.  
6. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A 
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 190 (2003). 
7. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 2. 
8. U.S FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT ON THE ARCTIC REFUGE COASTAL PLAIN: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES OF CONCERN 13 (2001), 
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This Comment opens by explaining the circumstances that 
allow oil development to take place in ANWR. ANWR, like 
other parts of the wildlife refuge system (“the System”), is 
managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).9 Although 
conservation is the top-tier use for ANWR,10 oil exploration 
and drilling are allowed in ANWR’s coastal plain, known as 
the “1002 Area,” if authorized by Congress.11 
Next, it describes the discord around the sufficiency of 
scientific information available to evaluate the environmental 
repercussions of oil development in this region.12 Although oil 
has been in production for many years in Arctic Alaska, a 
USGS report on energy development in Arctic Alaska found 
gaps in scientific knowledge that led the USGS to question 
whether there is sound basis upon which to make decisions 
regarding oil development in the region.13 For example, 
various sources predict totally disparate effects of oil 
development on the porcupine caribou.14 
                                                        
http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/arctic_oilandgas_impact.pdf [hereinafter FWS POTENTIAL 
IMPACTS]. 
9. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). Under current law for FWS management of national 
wildlife refuges (16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006)) and Alaskan refuges (43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-3 
(2012)), an activity may be allowed in a refuge only if it is compatible with the 
purposes of the particular refuge and the refuge system holistically. Many past bills 
proposed to open the 1002 Area for energy activities—none has passed to become 
law—bypassed the compatibility issue by stating that energy development is 
concluded to be compatible with ANWR’s purpose at the refuge’s establishment and no 
further decisions is required. See CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 25. 
10. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
11. Id. § 3143; Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, PL 96-487, 
December 2, 1980, 94 Stat 2371 [hereinafter ANILCA] (This Act expanded the Arctic 
Wildlife Range by 9.2 million acres and renamed it ANWR. ANILCA section 702(3) 
designated 8 million acres of the original Range as a wilderness area. In section 1002, 
the remainder 1.5 million acres Coastal Plain was excluded.). 
12. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1. 
13. Id. On March 31, 2010, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar asked the USGS to 
“conduct an initial, independent evaluation of the science needs that would inform the 
Administration’s consideration of the right places and the right ways in which to 
develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic OCS, particularly focused on the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas.” Id. 
14. The porcupine caribou is an example of a species whose fate in the presence of 
oil development is unclear. The FWS states that one of several potential impacts to the 
porcupine caribou herd from oil development—pipelines, roads, and structures—is a 
significant reduction in the amount and quality of food resources during and after 
calving. FWS POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 13. The Congressional Research 
Service’s (CRS) recent report on ANWR acknowledges inconclusive findings of impacts 
to the porcupine caribou. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16-17. On the other hand, 
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The sections that follow elucidate the roles of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the FWS with respect to 
oil development in ANWR. Although NEPA’s objective is to 
prevent damage to the environment,15 NEPA cannot fill the 
gap created by insufficient scientific knowledge.16 The FWS, in 
its responsibility for ANWR’s management, is charged with 
evaluating whether oil development is compatible with 
ANWR’s mission of ecological conservation.17 This is known as 
the compatibility test.18 
Finally, this Comment contends that the FWS’s statutory 
mandate and its compatibility requirement embody the 
precautionary principle, and accordingly, the FWS’s 
compatibility decisions should be grounded in the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is 
“foresight planning.”19 It requires actors to be proactive in 
preventing significant harms to human health and the 
environment.20 With the current insufficiency of scientific 
knowledge about the effects of oil development in ANWR, a 
FWS compatibility test that is based on the precautionary 
principle will yield a more environmentally sound decision 
than a decision not based on the precautionary principle. At 
this time, the FWS should proceed cautiously and deny oil 
development in ANWR’s 1002 Area in order to achieve 
ANWR’s goals of “conservation, management, 
and . . . restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources 
and their habitats.”21 
                                                        
proponents of oil development in the 1002 Area claim that there will be no negative 
impact to the caribou. ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, Top Ten Reasons to 
Support ANWR Development, http://www.anwr.org/ANWR-Basics/Top-ten-reasons-to-
support-ANWR-development.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Top Ten 
Reasons to Support ANWR Development]. They point to the growth of the Central 
Arctic Caribou Herd that migrates directly through the Prudhoe Bay oil field (the 
Central Arctic Caribou Herd has grown from 5000 animals in the early 1970s to well 
over 66,000 animals today). Id. 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2006). 
16. See infra pp. 247–54. 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM USES, SERVICE MANUALS, 603 FW 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/603fw2.pdf [hereinafter FWS MANUAL]. 
18. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 112. 
19. Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 21, 23 (2006). 
20. Id. at 22. 
21. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006). 
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II. THE CONDITIONS AND MEANS THAT ALLOW OIL 
DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR 
Refuges such as ANWR may be put to a variety of uses.22 
Conservation is ANWR’s dominant purpose, as dictated by the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 
but other uses have legitimacy in ANWR.23 ANILCA requires 
that the FWS develop a mandatory comprehensive unit plan 
and manage the refuge according to a defined hierarchy of 
purposes.24 A second federal statute, the 1997 National 
Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (Improvement Act), 
also governs the use of ANWR’s lands.25 The Improvement Act 
builds upon the hierarchical framework of ANILCA, 
prioritizing three levels of use, from highest to lowest priority: 
(1) conservation; (2) wildlife-dependent recreation; and (3) 
other uses.26 Oil development resides in the lowest position in 
this hierarchy and faces additional tests of compatibility and 
affirmative contribution.27 
ANILCA also designates all of ANWR, except for the 1002 
Area, as wilderness area.28 In not designating the 1002 Area as 
wilderness, Congress avoided deciding to either allow 
development or extend further protections of this region.29 
Instead, Congress included a provision in ANILCA requiring 
studies of all of the resources of the 1002 Area.30 Meanwhile, 
ANILCA barred any energy development absent Congressional 
authorization.31 
A. Oil Development is One of the Refuge System’s Designated 
Uses 
Oil development, as an economic use of natural resources, 
                                                        
22. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4) (2006). 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
24. Id. 
25. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 
1252 (1997) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006)). 
26. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 93. 
27. Id. 
28. ANILCA § 1003; 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006). 
29. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
30. 16 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006). 
31. Id. § 3143. 
6
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/4
336 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
inhabits the lowest place in the hierarchy of designated uses of 
the wildlife refuge system.32 Although less preferable than 
other uses of the System, oil development is properly permitted 
in the System when: (1) it is compatible with the System’s 
primary use; (2) it does not conflict with secondary uses; and 
(3) it positively affects a primary use.33 In 2001, some type of 
oil or gas exploration or development activity took place in 
twenty-two states, with forty-five wildlife refuges in fifteen 
states actually producing oil or gas.34 
Mineral resource development in the System generally 
occurs where the federal government leases its own subsurface 
oil and gas rights.35 The Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) 
manages the issuance and extension of leases.36 Through lease 
stipulation, these lessees are required to follow regulations 
that ensure adherence to the System’s conservation 
mission.37 The FWS, as the agency with control over lands 
dedicated for wildlife conservation, possesses comprehensive 
power to manage oil development.38 
B. ANILCA did not Designate the 1002 Area Coastal Plain as 
Wilderness 
In 1960, a secretarial public land order established the nine 
million acre Arctic National Wildlife Range (the Range).39 The 
Range encompasses the extremely valuable and controversial 
coastal plain.40 The federal government retains control over 
the land and beds underlying navigable and tidal waters, 
which encompasses the coastal plain.41 This area of the Range 
was separated from the unreserved public lands in 1957, thus 
placing it off limits for selection of state lands under Alaska’s 
                                                        
32. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 93. 
33. Id. at 193. 
34. Id. (citing U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-64R, U.S. FISH 
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: INFORMATION ON OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (2001)). 
35. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 193. 
36. Id. at 197. 
37. Id. at 194. 
38. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-1 (2011). 
39. See Pub. Land Order 2,214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (Dec. 9, 1960). 
40. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 190. 
41. Id. 
7
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statehood statute.42 The 1960 establishment document 
permitted oil and gas leasing in the Range.43 
In 1980, ANILCA added 9.2 million acres to the Range and 
renamed it the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.44 Most of the 
original national wildlife range was designated as wilderness, 
though 1.5 million acres of coastal plain were excluded.45 Areas 
designated as wilderness must be left unimpaired for future 
use, preserved in their wilderness state.46 As such, wilderness 
areas are completely precluded from oil development 
activities.47 However, because the coastal plain of ANWR was 
not designated as a wilderness area, oil exploration and 
drilling could potentially occur in that area. In fact, Congress 
labeled most of the coastal plain as the 1002 Area in order to 
arrange for a special study on the future leasing of oil and gas 
therein.48 ANILCA prohibits “leasing or other development 
leading to production of oil . . . from the range” unless 
otherwise authorized by Congress.49 
The Congressionally ordered resources study of the 1002 
Area was completed in 1987 by the Secretary of the Interior.50 
Known as the 1002 Report or the Final Legislative 
Environmental Impact Statement (FLEIS), the Secretary 
documented potential uses of the 1002 Area, ranging from total 
availability of the 1002 Area for oil and gas exploration and 
development (alternative A) to wilderness designation 
(alternative E).51 The Secretary recommended alternative 
                                                        
42. Id. Because Alaska entered the union in 1959 and the area covered by the Arctic 
National Wildlife Range in 1960 had been segregated from the unreserved public 
domain since 1957, this segregation explains why Alaska does not have control of the 
beds underlying navigable and tidal waters to the state. 
43. Id. 
44. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006)). 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006). 
46. Id. § 1131. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. § 3141. 
49. Id. § 3143. 
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, 
ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO 
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT (1987), available at 
http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/ANWR_coastal_LEIS.pdf [hereinafter FLEIS]. 
51. Id. at 102. 
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A.52 However, because ANILCA prohibits leasing and other oil 
development activities, the 1002 Area is currently managed as 
specified in alternative D (maintenance of status quo) until 
Congress directs otherwise.53 
III. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM OIL 
DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR IS INSUFFICIENT 
The production of oil in Arctic Alaska has been ongoing for 
many years, including in the Nation’s largest oil field at 
Prudhoe Bay, located just west of ANWR’s 1002 Area.54 
Despite years of proximate oil activities, there is considerable 
divergence of opinion regarding the adequacy of available 
scientific information to evaluate the environmental effects of 
oil development in ANWR’s coastal plain.55 Disagreements 
abound on what science is necessary, whether the right 
information is being collected, what scientific issues need to be 
addressed, and the status of the body of scientific information 
for those issues.56 Independent reports, including the USGS 
report, Congressional Research Service Primer for the 112th 
Congress, and FWS publications, have analyzed the state of 
scientific knowledge surrounding oil development and readily 
acknowledge discrepancies of opinions and data.57 For 
instance, the USGS report states that “[t]here are areas of 
significant scientific research that form a sound basis upon 
which to make decisions; there are areas where additional 
science is needed; but there also is an area in which more than 
science is needed.”58 
A. Oil Development Proponents: advances in technology and 
safety adequately minimize adverse environmental effects 
from oil development 
Oil development proponents claim several new technologies 
reduce the environmental footprint of oil development 
                                                        
52. Id. at 97–100. 
53. Id. at 102. 
54. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. passim; see also CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, passim. 
58. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 221. 
9
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activities in the harsh and changing Arctic environment.59 One 
of these advances is a reduction of operational area.60 New 
drill bits and fluids enable a less intrusive method of lateral 
drilling.61 This drilling type produces “designer” wells that 
allow a horizontal reach far beyond the footprint of the drill 
platform.62 The current record for a designer well reaches 
seven miles in radius, compared to the current industry 
standard for down-hole operations in Alaska at five miles.63 
Proponents claim the relatively small footprint of the surface 
well pad, coupled with the larger horizontal reach of the 
designer wells, lessens the environmental impact from oil-
related operations.64 
Another improvement is in ice-based transportation 
infrastructure.65 In the exploratory phase, ice pads are about 
ten acres in size.66 These relatively small pads are unstaffed 
and feasible when linked to bigger pads that provide housing, 
storage, maintenance facilities, airfields, and other support 
functions.67 Oil companies have also made improvements in 
response to changing climatic conditions, such as warming 
trends, which have shortened the utility of ice roads and pads 
and require instead the use of gravel structures. For example, 
some companies maximize the utility of ice roads and pads by 
using “two drilling rigs, rotating rigs at drill sites, starting ice 
road construction from both ends simultaneously, using 
                                                        
59. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 14. 
60. Id. Operational area of oil drilling includes above ground drillsite or pad and the 
below ground down-hole operation. Id. The drillsite or pad contains the drilling 
platform, rigs, equipment, storage, airfields, and other production infrastructure. Id. 
In 1970, for a down-hole operation, a drill site was about sixty-five acres above ground 
and reached approximately two miles in diameter underground. Id at Figure 6. In 
comparison, in 1999, a down-hole operation drill site was about thirteen acres above 
ground and reached approximately eight miles in diameter underground. Id. 
61. Id at 14. 
62. Id. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 13–14. 
65. Id. at 14. 
66. Id. Ice pads are drillsites made of ice, instead of the typical gravel. Id. Utilizing 
ice pads eliminates or reduces construction of gravel pads, which inherently leave 
greater environmental impact. Id. Ten-acre ice pads are considered small; in 
comparison, a modern Conoco-Phillips Alpine development located west of Prudhoe 
Bay, containing two pads, a connecting road, and an airstrip, totals 100 acres. Id. 
67. Id. at 14–15. 
10
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aircraft to reach remote sites, and prepositioning equipment 
and materials.”68 Tasks can then be accomplished faster 
during the shorter winter season,69 lessening the length and 
extent of disruption to the Arctic environment. 
In the course of planning for its oil exploration and 
development in ANWR, Shell, for example, responds to 
environmental concerns by gathering information that could 
help predict what it would encounter from nature.70 Shell 
hired a team of hydrologists, soil experts, and oceanographers 
to study the Arctic environment and the feeding and migratory 
habits of wildlife.71 For instance, after Shell’s consultants 
discovered that walrus calls stopped each time a seismic 
survey (firing of sound and impulses through the water) was 
conducted, Shell began studying how to muffle some of the 
noise from drilling operations.72 Shell is also mapping 
migration patterns of sea mammals tagged with tracking 
devices in order to plan its exploration activities with as little 
impact as possible.73 Moreover, in an effort to understand the 
effect of an oil spill in the Arctic, Shell uses underwater gliders 
to collect real time maps of currents.74 These maps along with 
oceanography studies of underwater fronts will provide data of 
where spilled oil is likely to end up.75 
Some Native people, such as the Alaska Natives (Inuit), 
support companies like Shell in their efforts to open energy 
development in ANWR.76 They argue that oil development can 
be carried out without harming the environment, including 
avoiding damage to the porcupine caribou herd.77 They 
reference the central arctic caribou herd that is found 
                                                        
68. Id. at 15 (“The Alpine Development Example”). 
69. Id.  
70. Steven Mufson, Proposed Oil Drilling Off Alaska Coast Prompts Studies of 
Environmental Impact, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 22, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/proposed-oil-drilling-off-alaska-
coast-prompts-studies-of-environmental-impact/2011/08/02/gIQAO6vsWJ_story.html. 
71. Id. at 2. 
72. Id. The report also said, “Repeated disruptions of vocal communications could 
potentially affect the maintenance of mother-pup bonds and herds’ integrity . . . Both 
rely almost exclusively on calls to remain in contact when separated by larger 
distances.” Id.  
73. Id. at 3. 
74. Id. at 4. 
75. Id. 
76. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16. 
77. Id. 
11
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seasonally in the oil fields area of Prudhoe Bay.78 This herd of 
caribou has increased significantly in numbers.79 
Although oil-related activities will always present an 
element of risk, companies like Shell argue that technological 
progress in equipment and infrastructure and sound practices 
based on scientific information adequately minimize the 
potential for adverse environmental impacts from oil 
exploration and drilling in ANWR.80 Oil companies want to 
convince their critics and governmental agencies that their 
recent research and their commitment to ongoing research are 
enough and they can drill safely with minimal environmental 
impacts.81  
B. Oil Development Opponents: too many unknowns and 
potential impacts from oil development 
Environmental organizations contend “[s]cience, not politics, 
needs to guide decision-making in America’s extreme, remote, 
and fragile Arctic Ocean. If we are to avoid irreparable harm to 
an ecosystem found nowhere else in the country, we need to 
develop a comprehensive research and monitoring plan and set 
aside significant areas for protection.”82 Moreover, the Pew 
Environment Group (Pew), a conservation organization with a 
stated mission of saving and protecting the natural 
environment and its inhabitants, contends these same harsh 
environmental conditions make avoiding, containing, or 
cleaning up an oil spill very difficult.83  
Unknown effects of oil development are also a concern. Pew 
criticizes any oil activity in the Arctic for lack of scientific 
understanding of the environmental effects.84 Pew points out 
that ice seals, polar bears, bowhead whales, and other marine 
mammals make their homes in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
                                                        
78. Id. 
79. Id.; Top Ten Reasons to Support ANWR Development, supra note 22. 
80. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 15. 
81. Mufson, supra note 70. 
82. Marilyn Heiman, Science Must Guide Offshore Arctic Conservation, 
Development, THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, Oct. 6, 2011, 
http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/opinions/science-must-guide-offshore-
arctic-conservation-development-85899364957#. 
83. Id. 
84. Id.  
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of the 1002 Area, a setting not found anywhere else in the 
United States.85 These animals have adapted to the area’s 
extreme conditions of sub-zero temperatures, high winds, and 
shifting ice plates.86 
Pew’s stance to halt any oil development in the Arctic 
because of inadequate information is echoed by many other 
organizations, scientists, and independent experts.87 Entities 
such as the Ocean Conservancy, the Sierra Club, Defenders of 
Wildlife, and the Center for Biological Diversity hold similar 
beliefs.88 Pew and the Ocean Conservancy asked scientists of 
various specializations for an assessment of the 2011 USGS 
report, discussed below.89 Although Pew’s resulting 
commentary praised the USGS assessment as thorough, 
thoughtful, unbiased, and structurally clear, it identified areas 
of incompleteness, such as historical context, identification and 
dissemination of recent and ongoing research, and setting 
research priorities.90  
Pew’s report points out that many scientific knowledge gaps, 
major and minor, were identified, but faults the USGS report 
because it did not rank its recommendations by importance in 
order to help guide policymakers and other decision-makers.91 
Thus, according to Pew, the USGS report represents a “good 
start”92 because it identifies necessary improvements in data 
collection and synthesis, which in turn can form the basis “for 
crafting a long-term, broad-scale monitoring program that is 
needed for almost all of the identified issues revolving around 
energy development impacts.”93 Ultimately, Pew concludes 
that oil development should wait for further scientific 
                                                        
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Arctic Shell Game: No Spill Plan, No Problem—Feds Say Just Drill, 
EARTHJUSTICE, Sept. 29, 2011, http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2011/arctic-shell-
game-no-spill-plan-no-problem-feds-say-just-drill. 
88. Id. 
89. PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP & OCEAN CONSERVANCY, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
OF USGS CIRCULAR 1370: “AN EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE NEEDS TO INFORM 
DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHUKCHI 
AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA” (Robert B. Spies ed.) (Aug. 28, 2011), 
http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/USGS-
Report-Review-Sept2011.pdf. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 7. 
92. Id. at 29. 
93. Id. at 19. 
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knowledge.94 
C. Government Reports Show Scientific Uncertainty and 
Lack of Knowledge 
As the debate over energy development in ANWR continued 
in Congress, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
prepared a primer to provide background information on the 
contested issues.95 The CRS report acknowledges that the crux 
of the debate lies in the divergent opinions as to whether an 
intrusion on ANWR’s ecosystem can be justified.96 The CRS 
primer points out that the debate about energy development in 
ANWR has been ongoing for over fifty years, but the sharp rise 
in energy prices in current years has intensified this 
controversy.97 Substantively, this report confirms the widely 
divergent perspectives about oil development in ANWR. On 
one hand, development advocates assert that “ANWR oil could 
be developed with minimal environmental harm, 
and . . . development could be limited to a total of 2000 
acres.”98 Conversely, environmental advocates claim that 
“intrusion on this ecosystem cannot be justified on any 
terms . . . [and] development would be widely scattered, with 
irreparable impacts.”99 
Meanwhile, with approval of oil activities in the Arctic seas, 
the Secretary of the Interior asked the USGS to summarize 
existing key scientific data, develop a process to figure out 
where knowledge gaps are, and give preliminary advice on 
what research is required to improve decision-making for outer 
continental shelf energy development in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas near ANWR.100 The USGS was tasked with 
addressing four topics: “climate change considerations, marine 
mammals and seismic activities, oil-spill response, and 
cumulative impacts.”101 The USGS team examined available 
                                                        
94. Id. at 31. 
95. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, passim. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at i. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1. 
101. Id. at 3. 
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literature, including hundreds of reports, workshop findings, 
policy publications, web sites, and science journals, and 
engaged forty-six entities in an inclusive effort to understand 
the science gap and sufficiency.102  
The USGS’s initial analysis of public policy documents 
confirmed the variation in what are considered “science gaps” 
and what constitutes “sufficient science.”103 “Interpretation of 
concepts are [sic] dynamic, tied to an individual’s or 
organization’s held beliefs, and what they most strongly value 
within their thought process when dealing with complexity 
and uncertainty.”104 Moreover, the multiple layers of federal, 
state, local, and regional organizations and communities that 
have differing perspectives on the degree of required scientific 
data only exacerbate the situation.105 
According to the USGS, “[t]here is no ‘silver bullet’” to 
address the critical gaps of scientific knowledge in the 
Arctic.106 But, it believes its recommended strategic actions 
should commence to better support decision-making.107 The 
USGS promotes a transparent process to balance “tradeoffs 
associated with ‘inaction until more information is in hand’ 
versus ‘action not sufficiently informed’” for evaluating the 
impacts and challenges of the emerging Arctic oil 
development.108 
The USGS identified key recommendations crucial to 
informed decision-making.109 These include: 
 Conduct more research on the effects of climate 
change on storms and ocean circulation, as they are 
critical to the safety of oil development. 
 Gather 3-D seismic data to better understand 
geological history of the area and its oil potential. 
 Improve understanding of the physical 
oceanography, like circulation processes and wind for 
oil-spill modeling, oil-spill response, and cleanup 
efforts, noting that the physical understanding of the 
                                                        
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 221. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 217. 
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Arctic Outer Continental Shelf is not comparable 
with the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf. 
 Continue to research the impact of noise on marine 
mammals and how overall ambient noises vary 
seasonally and spatially; large uncertainty still exists 
even with multiple studies conducted. 
 Require evaluation of all relevant data and 
formulation of guidelines, best practices, regulations, 
and policies, including ongoing monitoring to 
understand changes in the ecosystem and its health. 
 Continue facilitating the gathering, integration, and 
sharing of data to understand the Arctic as an 
interdependent system and the cumulative impacts 
of human activities.110 
Therefore, although some valuable information has been 
compiled, including identification of key information gaps, the 
USGS report highlights the extensive gaps in knowledge about 
the environmental impacts of oil development in the Arctic.111 
IV. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
Some might argue that the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) can adequately protect against environmental 
injuries in ANWR. NEPA advances two purposes: first, to 
prevent damage to the environment; second, to educate 
decision makers of the environmental impact of their 
decisions.112 The instrument through which NEPA meets its 
stated intentions is the Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all 
                                                        
110. Id. at 217–21. 
111. The USGS evaluation illustrates how little is known about the environmental 
impacts of oil development in the Arctic region. The sources used in the USGS further 
suggest that little is known about the environmental effects of oil development in the 
Arctic region. The USGS’s report is not specifically about oil development in ANWR’s 
1002. Rather, it discusses development in the Arctic’s Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
Outer Continental Shelves. Furthermore, in discussing anticipated impacts to the 
porcupine caribou, for example, the FWS refers to the 1987 FLEIS findings. See FWS 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 4. This suggests that no scientific study more 
comprehensive or recent has been done regarding oil development in ANWR. 
Therefore, scientific knowledge of environmental impacts on 1002 Area oil 
development, versus the Arctic generally, may be lacking even more than stated in the 
USGS report. 
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2006). 
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actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”113 Oil development in ANWR clearly requires 
the preparation of an EIS. However, NEPA is a procedural 
mandate that does not dictate the level or type of information 
federal agencies must consider in their decision-making 
process. Therefore, NEPA does not solve the problem of 
insufficient knowledge. 
A. NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement 
The EIS serves NEPA’s “action-forcing” objective by 
requiring that federal agencies take a “hard-look” at available 
evidence and fully consider detailed information about 
environmental impacts.114 The EIS requirement “inevitably 
bring[s] pressure to bear on agencies to respond to the needs of 
environmental quality.”115 This mandated process focuses the 
agency’s attention on the effects of the action on the 
environment so that vital impacts are not overlooked, 
underestimated, or discovered after the action and/or resources 
have already deployed.116 Further, the publication of an EIS 
serves to give the public the assurance that the agency has 
studied and contemplated the environmental impacts; creates 
an opportunity for public comment; and offers affected entities 
notice of the expected consequences.117 And when there is an 
“irretrievable commitment of resources,” the analysis in the 
EIS has to be site specific.118 
An important component of an EIS is the discussion of 
mitigation measures.119 NEPA requires agencies to thoroughly 
explore and document “any adverse environmental effects 
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented”120 and a reasonable discussion on possible 
mitigation measures to counter these effects.121 Without such 
                                                        
113. Id. § 4332(C). 
114. Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2006). 
115. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (citing 
115 CONG. REC. 40,425 (1969)) (referring to the strong precatory language of NEPA     
§ 101). 
116. Northern Alaska, 457 F.3d at 975. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 975–76 (citing Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
119. Id. at 352 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1987)) (CEQ definition of mitigation). 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii) (2006). 
121. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). 
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preparation regarding mitigation, NEPA’s “action-forcing” 
function is undermined and thus, “neither the agency nor other 
interested groups and individuals can properly evaluate the 
severity of the adverse effects.”122 But, although a reasonable 
study of mitigation steps is mandated through a “hard-look” of 
the environmental impacts, there is no requirement that a 
complete mitigation plan is drafted and enacted.123 This 
reasonableness standard is consistent with NEPA’s reliance on 
mechanisms of procedure rather than substantive 
regulations.124 
B. NEPA’s Procedural Limitations When There is Scientific 
Uncertainty 
As a major action that is expected to significantly affect the 
environment, oil development in ANWR will likely trigger 
NEPA’s EIS requirement. However, NEPA is solely a 
procedural directive, and case law suggests that NEPA will not 
fill existing gaps in scientific knowledge. 
In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt,125 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that preparation of an EIS 
is required where there are effects that are highly uncertain or 
have unique or unknown dangers to the environment.126 The 
purpose of an EIS is to avoid speculation and confirm that 
available data is gathered and analyzed before the action is 
allowed.127 Thus, although there is a lack of scientific 
knowledge about the environmental impacts from oil 
development in ANWR, an EIS will still be required before oil 
development can commence. 
NEPA, however, does not oblige an agency to make a “worst 
                                                        
122. Id. at 352. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 353. 
125. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001) (The 
Park Service was required to prepare an EIS under NEPA, rather than an 
environmental assessment (EA) that resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(FONSI), for the fact that the increase of cruise ships into the unique, important 
environment of Glacier Bay is a “major Federal action . . . [that] significantly affects 
the quality of the human environment” even in the presence of great scientific 
uncertainty and controversy.). 
126. Id. 
127. Id.; see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
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case analysis” in its EIS, even if it is unable to reasonably 
assess a proposed action’s environmental impact.128 In 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,129 the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that although the worst case 
rule was admittedly more demanding, NEPA favors a “hard 
look” and public disclosures, rather than a highly speculative 
emphasis on harms.130 As in Methow Valley, an EIS for oil 
development in ANWR is not required to contemplate a worst 
case scenario where human or machine failure causes 
catastrophic environmental injuries. 
The Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne131 court defined a “hard 
look” by an agency as one that “‘consider[s] all foreseeable 
direct and indirect impacts’ . . . [and] should involve a 
discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly 
minimize negative side effects.”132 The hard look requires 
agencies to consider the environmental impacts of all stages of 
a process, and any later plans for actual exploration and 
development by lessees is reviewable before the action can take 
place.133 But, agencies are not expected to delay decisions until 
all environmental effects are understood.134 Moreover, courts 
will be highly deferential to agency decisions, reviewing them 
under the “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or 
                                                        
128. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989) 
(discussing the amendment to CEQ regulations removing the worst case requirement 
in EIS analysis; NEPA does not require that uncertainty in predicting environmental 
damage be tackled solely by a worst case analysis). 
129. Id. (In consideration of whether the Forest Service, faced with scientific 
uncertainty, was required to make a “worst case analysis” and a fully developed 
mitigation plan in its EIS, the Supreme Court held that the Forest Service was not so 
required and NEPA simply requires agencies to summarize “existing relevant and 
credible scientific evidence and an evaluation of adverse impacts based on generally 
accepted scientific approaches or research methods.”). 
130. Id. at 334. 
131. Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2005) (Where plaintiff-
environmental organization claimed that the EIS analysis for an action to make the 
entire Northwest Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NWPA) available for oil and gas leasing 
should have been site specific since there were legitimate concerns of uncertainty of 
adverse consequences that future development may cause, the court pointed out that 
concerns of uncertainty of future actions are inherent in any program of natural 
resources development and thus, plaintiff’s assertion that the agency violated NEPA 
fails at this juncture but can be raised at the exploration and permit stages of the 
leasing program.). 
132. Id. at 975 (quoting Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 
963 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
133. Id. at 977 (see 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(c)). 
134. Id. at 977 (quoting North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 600 (1980)). 
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otherwise not in accordance with the law” standard.135 As 
such, under the “hard look” mandate, mitigation plans for oil 
development in ANWR—those based on utilization of best 
technologies or those that respond to actual conditions—must 
be considered by FWS, but under Kempthorne the FWS need 
not perform field tests or implement mitigation plans in order 
to be in compliance with NEPA.  
NEPA also requires that an EIS include a detailed 
statement of alternatives to an agency’s proposed action.136 
This alternatives requirement attempts to ensure that the 
most optimal decision will be made.”137 But, NEPA does not 
require that every possible alternative be considered by the 
agency so long as it has an explanation for eliminating that 
alternative.138 As the CRS Primer explains, the precise location 
of oil in ANWR is unknown.139 Alternative methods of oil 
development, such as changing drilling methods, platform 
locations, and infrastructure design, are likely to be numerous 
and highly divergent. In turn, each variable changes the 
expected environmental impacts. Although NEPA’s goal is to 
ultimately achieve the best decision,140 here, NEPA compliance 
may mean that the selected option will result in more adverse 
environmental impacts than other available alternatives. 
Additionally, in Sierra Club v. Marita,141 the court held that 
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply 
prescribes the necessary process.”142 Although the agency is 
                                                        
 135.Id. (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 
1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2006))). 
136. Id. at 978 (see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2006)). 
137. Id. at 978 (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States 
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
138. Id. at 978 (citing Westlands Water District v. United States Dep’t of the 
Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
139. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 22. 
140. Northern Alaska, 457 F.3d at 978. 
141. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995) (Plaintiff, an environmental 
organization, sued the Forest Service to enjoin timber harvesting, road construction, 
and creation of wildlife openings for the Service’s failure to consider certain ecological 
principles of biological diversity. Although the court found biological diversity should 
be further explored, the science in general “had not been applied to forest management 
in the Lake States,” thus, the court held that the Forest Service was not required to 
apply conservation biology in its environmental analysis under NEPA.). 
142. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 
(1989)). 
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required to look at and disclose foreseeable impacts to the 
environment from the proposed alternatives, “NEPA does not 
require . . . an EIS [to be] based on the best scientific 
methodology available, nor does it require resol[ution of] 
disagreements among various scientists as to methodology.”143 
The Marita court deferred to the agency’s chosen scientific 
method. In this recurring theme of deference to agency’s 
decisions, for oil development in ANWR the FWS has 
discretion to choose the science it wishes to follow because 
NEPA is a procedural law. To comply with NEPA, the FWS is 
not required to attain a defined level of information prior to 
evaluating the environmental impacts of oil development. 
Thus, NEPA cannot fill the gap when there is a lack of 
knowledge. 
V. THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANAGES 
ANWR 
The FWS manages ANWR as part of the System’s public 
lands classification.144 In addition, ANILCA imposes special 
rules on ANWR’s management that require the FWS to 
prepare a comprehensive refuge unit plan and delineate tiers 
of purposes.145 Federal law allows oil exploration and drilling 
in ANWR’s coastal plain, the 1002 Area, with the approval of 
Congress.146 Following such approval, the FWS must then 
determine if oil development is compatible with the refuge’s 
higher-tiered purposes and contributes to the System’s 
conservation mission.147  This is known as the compatibility 
test.148 
                                                        
143. Id. at 623 (quoting Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 
976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 
F.3d 1346, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that responsibility of the court “is to ensure 
that the Forest Service’s procedures resulted in a reasoned analysis and disclosure of 
the evidence before it”). 
144. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
145. Id. § 3101. 
146. Id. § 3143. 
147. Id. § 668dd. 
148. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 112. 
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A. ANWR is Part of the Wildlife Refuge System Under the 
Public Lands Classification 
Congress delegates the power to make rules and implement 
policy to land management agencies such as the FWS and the 
National Park Service.149 For ANWR, this power is given to the 
FWS through the Improvement Act.150 This entrustment of 
authority allows Congress to avoid entanglement in the 
details.151 The FWS, with its particular expertise, can adapt 
quickly to changing situations.152 The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that Congress’ broad power over public lands 
goes beyond the rights of a regular, private owner and federal 
preemption trumps all conflicting state laws.153 
The System occupies a notable place in the public land 
classification in that its dominant purpose is nature 
protection.154 During the past four decades, economic, political, 
and social forces shaped many land classifications, including 
the System, into accommodating multiple uses rather than a 
single-purpose, exclusive use.155 These forces also influenced 
the System to accept other uses alongside its promotion of 
ecological values.156 Currently, federal public lands’ dominant 
use systems consist of the national parks and the national 
wildlife refuges.157 The System is comprised of acquired and 
reserved lands that are primarily managed by the FWS.158 
The System is comprised of two major categories: 
coordination areas and refuges.159 States manage coordination 
areas under cooperative agreements or leases from the FWS.160 
Coordination areas are also excluded from comprehensive 
planning and compatibility determination requirements 
                                                        
149. Id. at 16. 
150. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 
Stat. 1252 (1997) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006)). 
151. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 16. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 16 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1967)). 
154. Id. at 19. 
155. Id. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. at 21. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 25. 
160. Id. 
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arising from the Improvement Act.161 Refuges, however, are 
managed by the FWS through strict adherence to mandates of 
the Improvement Act.162 
There is at least one unit of refuge in every state.163 Alaska 
holds eighty-five percent of the System’s acreage in four 
percent of refuge units.164 ANWR sits at the top of the list of 
giant refuges with 19.3 million acres.165 The System’s purpose 
of wildlife conservation is apparent in its support of more than 
700 bird, 220 mammal, 250 reptile and amphibian, and 200 
fish species, including a total of 180 animal and 78 plant types 
listed under the Endangered Species Act.166 
The System accommodates many other uses and brings in 
approximately 37 million visitors each year.167 Significant 
wildlife-dependent recreation, such as hunting, fishing, 
wildlife observation, and environmental education, occurs in 
the System.168 Nonwildlife-dependent recreation, such as 
boating, swimming, and camping, is also common.169 Further, 
economic uses like logging, commercial fishing and trapping, 
and mining, along with their requisite rights-of-way for roads, 
pipelines, and other utilities, occur with regularity.170 Not 
surprisingly, conflicts arise between these uses and the 
conservation mission of the System. 
B. The Mandates of ANILCA and the Improvement Act 
ANILCA imposes additional administrative and managerial 
requirements on the FWS in its management of ANWR.171 
First, the FWS must prepare a comprehensive refuge unit 
plan.172 A comprehensive refuge unit plan requires the FWS to 
engage in full-scale, complete refuge planning.173 Second, 
                                                        
161. Id. 
162. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
163. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 29. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 25, 30. 
168. Id. at 30. 
169. Id. at 31. 
170. Id. 
171. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
172. Id. § 668dd(e)(1)(A). 
173. Id. 
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ANILCA establishes a hierarchy of purposes to which the FWS 
must adhere when managing ANWR.174  
1. ANWR’s Comprehensive Refuge Unit Plan 
A comprehensive refuge unit plan must explain the natural 
and cultural significance of the refuge, define areas suitable for 
access and use as administrative facilities, and identify 
problems that may result in adversities for the populations 
and habitats of fish and wildlife.175 Providing a basic roadmap 
to meet the refuge’s goals, ANILCA mandates that each Alaska 
refuge has a “comprehensive conservation plan” (CCP) that 
addresses four substantive elements: 
 Designate areas within the refuge according to their 
respective resources and values; 
 Specify programs for conserving fish and wildlife, 
and other special values, to be implemented within 
each area; 
 Specify the uses within each area that may be 
compatible with the major purposes of the refuge; 
and 
 Set forth those opportunities that will be provided (if 
compatible with refuge purposes) for fish and 
wildlife-oriented recreation, ecological research, 
environmental education, and interpretation.176 
These four planning elements are the only substantive 
statutory management requirements for the contents of a 
CCP.177 Taken together, they force the FWS to look ahead at 
how to zone the refuges in order to achieve its goals, anticipate 
future actions, and incorporate public input.178 The original 
CCP for ANWR was signed into effect in 1988.179 The FWS is 
now midway through a two year undertaking to revise the 
1988 CCP.180 Cautionary in nature, these planning mandates 
                                                        
174. Id. 
175. Id. § 668dd(e). 
176. Id. § 668dd(e)(2). 
177. Id. 
178. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 55. 
179. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, Revising the Comprehensive Conservation 
Plan (CCP), http://arctic.fws.gov/ccp.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
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contain proactive measures that look to survey future 
conditions towards the refuge’s goals. 
2. ANWR’s Designated Uses 
Although there is general agreement that conservation is 
the top-line use for refuges, disagreement still exists over what 
other uses have legitimacy in the System.181 For Alaskan 
refuges, ANILCA’s tiering system controls subordinate uses 
with statements of intent such as “to the maximum extent 
practicable” and “in a manner consistent with [higher priority 
conservation purposes].”182 In 1997, the Improvement Act built 
upon ANILCA’s tiering system when the Act constructed three 
basic tiers, from highest to lowest: 1) conservation; 2) wildlife-
dependent recreation; 3) other uses for all refuges in the 
System.183 
ANILCA permits subsistence uses,184 which are accorded a 
high priority, allowing for displacement of other uses.185 
Subsistence uses are unique in ANWR because in Alaska, 
hunting and fishing are neither fully recreational nor fully 
commercial; they include customary uses by rural Alaskan 
inhabitants for direct consumption as food, shelter, fuel, 
clothing, tools, or transportation, and for indirect consumption 
such as barter or sharing.186 Subsistence use allowance is 
limited only by public safety, administrative, and conservation 
limitations,187 though the FWS acknowledges these constraints 
can be very broad and subject to the agency’s discretion.188 The 
FWS affirms that administrative limitation may be employed 
to safeguard the refuge’s purposes and to responsibly manage 
the refuge.189 
As an economic use, oil development occupies the lowest 
rung of designated uses in ANWR.190 In order to be permitted, 
oil development must be compatible with ANWR’s primary 
                                                        
181. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 89. 
182. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
183. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 89. 
184. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (2000). 
185. Id. §§ 3112(2), 3114. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. §§ 668dd(a)(3)(C), 3126(b). 
188. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 185. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 93. 
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use—conservation—and secondary uses such as subsistence.191 
VI. THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S 
COMPATIBILITY TEST 
The FWS possesses statutory authority under the 
Improvement Act to require uses in national wildlife refuges, 
like ANWR, to be compatible with the refuge’s dominant 
use.192 This means that the Secretary “shall not initiate or 
permit a new use of a refuge or expand, renew, or extend an 
existing use of a refuge, unless the Secretary has determined 
that the use is a compatible use and is not inconsistent with 
public safety.”193 
A. The Compatibility Test 
The Improvement Act requires the Secretary to issue 
regulations to “maintain the biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health of the National Wildlife Refuge System 
for present and future generations of Americans.”194 Uses that 
may conflict with the maintenance of ecological integrity are 
not compatible.195 The FWS regulates permitting of proposed 
uses on refuges by administering its compatibility test. 
1. The Refuge Manual 
In order to promulgate a consistent compatibility evaluation 
that satisfies the System’s mission of conservation, the FWS 
prepared and published a Refuge Manual.196 The manual 
specifically requires a compatibility test for all refuge uses and 
their associated facilities and improvements.197 
The manual provides guidelines for making a compatibility 
test.198 It lists all information required for making a 
compatibility decision. Among the items in this list are: the 
                                                        
191. Id. at 193. 
192. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
193. Id. 
194. FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 5. 
197. Id. 
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name of the refuge and its purpose(s), detailed description of 
the proposed use (action), the resource requirements of 
administration and management of the use, anticipated 
impacts from the use, public comments, and what stipulations 
are necessary to confirm compatibility.199 In each step of the 
compatibility test—from the preparation of the description and 
assessment of impacts of the proposed use to the professional 
review of the issues involved with that proposed use—a wealth 
of information and scientific data are needed to fulfill the test’s 
objective. 
2. The Role and Responsibilities of the Refuge Manager 
Refuge managers are tasked with determining whether 
proposed or existing uses are subject to the compatibility 
requirements.200 If the use is required to be compatible, the 
refuge manager must determine whether that use is 
compatible.201 The refuge manager is required to document all 
determinations in writing.202 In addition, the refuge manager 
must ensure that the FWS provides a forum for the public to 
review and comment on compatibility determinations.203 
Through the FWS Director’s delegation, refuge managers 
have the authority to make compatibility determinations.204 
Because of the complexities in determining compatibility, 
refuge managers are directed to consider their knowledge and 
experiences of the biological resources under examination.205 
Additionally, refuge managers must “make conclusions that 
are consistent with the principles of sound fish and wildlife 
management and administration . . . .” 
Refuge managers rely on “sound professional judgment” in 
their administration of the compatibility test.206 Using their 
sound professional judgment, they must determine issues such 
as whether the proposed action will materially frustrate, either 
directly or indirectly, the fulfillment of the System’s mission or 
                                                        
199. Id. at 11–15. 
200. Id. at 4. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 8. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
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the purpose(s) of the refuge.207 Refuge managers have to look 
at tangible impacts, current or future, that affect the FWS’s 
ability to fulfill the refuge’s mission and purposes. For 
instance, a regulated taking of many animals from a refuge 
may actually help manage and improve the health of a wildlife 
population.208 But, the removal of one animal of a threatened 
or endangered species or minor harassment of a species during 
critical biological times could irreparably harm the refuge’s 
ability to maintain and perpetuate that species.209 Thus, refuge 
managers must be able to appropriately evaluate the types of 
effects being contemplated from a proposed use. Further, 
refuge managers are required to consider direct and indirect 
impacts from the proposed use, including cumulative impacts, 
when other existing or planned uses in the refuge or adjacent 
areas are at play.210 
3. The Compatibility Test is Refuge-Specific 
In addition to using sound professional judgment in making 
compatibility determinations, refuge managers base their 
evaluation “on a refuge-specific analysis of reasonably 
anticipated impacts of a particular use on refuge resources.”211 
In this section of the Refuge Manual, the FWS requires that 
the refuge manager’s evaluation be focused and targeted to the 
refuge at issue, rather than the broader system.212 This section 
again prohibits an affirmative finding of compatibility when 
there is not enough information available to the refuge 
manager.213 
Refuge managers utilize information from field experience 
and familiarity with refuge resources, data from states, tribes, 
proponents or opponents of the use, and public input.214 
Although refuge-specific analysis need not be based on refuge-
specific biological data, such information may be considered if 
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the data is gathered from a similarly situated area and thus is 
relevant to the inquiry.215 Managers should also differentiate 
between short-term and long-term impacts.216 A use that may 
have only minor impact on the refuge’s resources at the onset 
could become cumulatively significant over time.217 
Additionally, refuge managers must be mindful of indirect 
impacts that may be “reasonably associated with a specific 
use” such as those that take away or divert resources away 
from an activity that does contribute to the refuge’s mission.218 
B. The Failures of the Compatibility Test 
Theoretically, the compatibility test for proposed uses should 
curb the proliferation of incompatible uses.219 However, the 
FWS has broad discretion to choose how to implement the 
test.220 As a result, incompatible secondary uses are now 
permitted in many refuges.221 Incompatible secondary uses 
that are often approved by the FWS include mining, off-road 
vehicles, air boats, military exercises, waterskiing, power 
boats, rights-of-way, grazing, logging, hunting, and beach 
use.222 
The Des Lacs Refuge in North Dakota is an example of a 
refuge that suffered as a result of incompatible use.223 The Des 
Lacs Refuge is home to wetlands and migratory birds, but is 
also a popular destination for recreational boating.224 The FWS 
kept the water level high at the lake for recreational 
boating.225 As a result, the FWS could not manage the 
                                                        
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 13. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 58. A report by the Government Accounting Office 
released in 1989 documented the failure of the FWS to make changes to widespread 
approvals of incompatible uses. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-89-
196, NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH 
INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD ACTION (1989) [hereinafter CONTINUING 
PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD ACTION]. 
220. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 59. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. (citing CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD 
ACTION, supra note 240). 
223. Id. at 59. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
29
Tanus: Oil Development in ANWR: The Precautionary Principle Is Compatibl
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
2012] OIL DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR 359 
wetlands for the refuge’s primary purpose, which was 
migratory bird production.226 Noise from power boats and 
waterskiing also unsettled the nesting activities of the birds.227 
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) looked into the 
FWS’s management of the Des Lacs Refuge and found two 
main causes for mismanagement.228 First, the FWS allowed 
nonbiological factors, such as political and economic (local 
commerce) interests, to influence its approval.229 Second, the 
FWS lacked financial data on the costs of managing the 
secondary recreational uses.230 
The mismanagement of the Des Lacs Refuge inspired the 
hierarchy of uses in the Improvement Act.231 After the findings 
in Des Lacs Refuge, the Improvement Act was the vehicle that 
strengthened the FWS’s commitment to its compatibility test 
by prioritizing uses.232 This tiering system, in part, aims to 
assist refuge managers in their determination of 
compatibility.233 The Improvement Act also dictates protection 
of wildlife, plants, and the environment, encouraging the FWS 
to “just say no” to incompatible, nonpriority uses.234 However, 
there are real limitations to the compatibility test. For 
instance, the last sentence in the Refuge Manual’s chapter on 
compatibility, states: “Compatibility determinations are an 
integral part of our decision about refuge uses; however, it is 
important to note that compatibility is only one of many 
factors that we take into account when we consider allowing or 
not allowing a refuge use.”235 
C. The Language of the Compatibility Test Declares Caution 
As designed, the compatibility test is infused with caution. 
Compatibility is a threshold determination on whether the 
                                                        
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 59. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 62. 
232. Id. at 61. 
233. Id. at 62–63. 
234. Id. at 201. 
235. FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 16–17. 
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proposed use will “materially interfere with or detract” from 
the ability to meet the System’s mission or refuge’s 
purpose(s).236 The compatibility test must evaluate the use 
separately and in aggregate with other existing or planned 
uses.237 The burden of proof is on the proposer of the use.238 
For anticipated impacts of the use, refuge managers: 
[W]ill use and cite available sources of information . . . . 
Sources may include planning documents, . . . . 
environmental impact statements, . . . . field 
management experience and consultation with wildlife 
research professionals, state wildlife resource managers 
and industry professionals . . . . If available information 
is insufficient . . . then the refuse manager would be 
unable to make an affirmative finding of compatibility 
and we must not authorize or permit the use.239 
If the use is a priority public use and there is insufficient 
information available, a refuge manager does not need to 
generate her own data in making compatibility evaluations.240 
She is directed to work with the proponent of the use to attain 
the needed information.241 The burden to collect information 
does not shift to the manager.242 But, she should move towards 
identifying the gaps in data and assist in facilitation of 
information gathering.243 In all cases, a refuge manager should 
not approve a proposed use until there is an affirmative 
showing of compatibility, thus eliminating the risk of 
unexpected adverse impacts.244 These protective measures 
demonstrate the cautious makeup of the FWS’s compatibility 
regulations. 
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VII. THE FWS SHOULD RECOGNIZE AND CARRY OUT 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE EMBEDDED IN 
ITS COMPATIBILITY STATUTE AND REGULATIONS 
Protective mechanisms are in place to protect against 
environmental injuries in ANWR. Caution is inherent in the 
prohibition on oil development in ANWR absent Congressional 
approval and the FWS compatibility test for any proposed use. 
This paper advocates that the precautionary principle, as 
defined at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, is already 
part and parcel of ANILCA’s compatibility requirement and 
the FWS’s corresponding regulations. As such the FWS should 
utilize the precautionary principle in assessing potential 
environmental impacts of oil development in ANWR’s 1002 
Area. Because of the likely irreparable and permanent effects 
on the environment from oil exploration and drilling,245 
sufficient information is critical and should be demanded. 
Relying on best available science is not enough to determine 
compatibility. Employing the precautionary principle ensures 
that the FWS makes decisions with full comprehension of the 
environmental impacts and protects ANWR’s biological 
integrity and diversity, environmental health, and mission of 
conservation. 
A. The Precautionary Principle Generally 
The precautionary principle embraces scientific uncertainty, 
which is often intrinsic to predictions of environmental 
impacts.246 At its core, the precautionary principle “cautions 
that regulatory policy should be proactive in ferreting out 
potentially serious threats to human health and the 
environment, as confirmed by the history of human exposure 
to substances such as lead and asbestos.”247 
The precautionary principle originates from the German 
concept of Vorsorgeprinzip, which was developed in the 1970s 
to prevent air pollution’s harm to forests.248 When translated, 
Vorsorgeprinzip means “foresight planning.” The German 
                                                        
245. FWS POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 7–15. 
246. Percival, supra note 19, at 23–24. 
247. Id. at 22. 
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Federal Interior Ministry explained the precautionary 
principle as one that “commands that the damages done to the 
natural world . . . should be avoided in advance and in 
accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further 
means the early detection of dangers to health and 
environment by comprehensive, synchronized . . . research, in 
particular about cause and effect relationships, . . . acting 
when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not 
yet available.”249 The precautionary principle was utilized by 
many countries in their early environmental statutes, 
beginning in the 1960s through the 1980s.250 At the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro, the principle, in its most 
universally accepted formulation, found its most noteworthy 
endorsement when 178 nations, including the United States, 
signed the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.251 At this summit, the participating nations 
agreed that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States . . . .”252 
Today, there are many iterations of the precautionary 
principle. The numerous versions vary in their degree of 
balance and integration of scientific, economic, political, and 
social values with the objective of risk management and 
protection of the environment.253 The approaches are 
differentiated by the amount of risk and uncertainty necessary 
as a threshold matter to trigger the principle, the weights 
appropriated to competing interests and values, and the rights 
and responsibilities of the pertinent party(ies) being 
regulated.254 A robust version of the precautionary principle is 
one of preemption, where the burden is placed on proving that 
the action is not harmful or when the activity is banned 
                                                        
249. Id. at 24 (citing NORA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR 
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE 11 (2003)). 
250. Percival, supra note 19, at 24. 
251. Id. at 28. 
252. Id. (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janiero, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1, Principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992)). 
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altogether.255 At this extreme end, the cost of being 
precautious is paralysis, and critics contend that utilization of 
the precautionary principle deprives society of benefits, 
eliminates opportunities for innovation, and may carry other 
substitute risks.256 A more balanced precautionary approach is 
one that was embraced at the Rio de Janeiro Summit. The Rio 
de Janeiro Summit defined the precautionary principle as: 
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainly shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”257 Under this version of the precautionary 
principle, the principle is invoked when identification of the 
potential danger has been made and, even with objective 
assessment, the risk for that danger cannot be calculated with 
sufficient certainty.258 
Domestically, the United States government has used this 
balanced precautionary approach more often than the 
preemptive precautionary approach in addressing ecological 
harms. For example, NEPA incorporates the principle in spirit 
by requiring federal decision makers to be fully informed of the 
environmental consequences of their decisions through the EIS 
process.259 The Clean Air Act, as another example, requires the 
Environmental Protection Agency to monitor fuel additives 
that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare.”260 This differs from the Clean Air Act’s previous 
language that applied regulation only for additives that “will 
endanger public health or welfare.”261 In a landmark holding 
in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA’s regulation in the Clean 
                                                        
255. Id. at 419. 
256. Id. 
257. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1, Principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
258. Kannan, supra note 253, at 420. 
259. Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 122–23 (2009). 
260. Id. at 122 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 
401(e), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (2006))) (emphasis 
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Air Act.262 The court endorsed the precautionary approach of 
the Act and explained that “[r]egulatory action may be taken 
before the threatened harm occurs; indeed the very existence 
of . . . precautionary legislation would seem to demand that 
regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the 
perceived threat.”263 
B. Application of the Precautionary Principle to Proposed Oil 
Development in ANWR 
Oil development in ANWR has a high potential for causing 
significant, irreparable, and permanent harm to a region that 
supports a unique ecosystem and valuable fish and wildlife 
resources, as well as to the Native people who rely on these 
resources for subsistence.264 As previously discussed, there is 
intense discord among the public, governmental entities, 
pertinent industry participants, and other stakeholders over 
the ability to explore and develop oil safely, the environmental 
consequences of oil development, and how to implement impact 
prevention and mitigation plans.265 Presently, available 
science cannot adequately show the long-term effects of oil 
development in ANWR. 
The precautionary principle upholds the purpose and 
statutory intent of the compatibility requirement as 
administered by the FWS compatibility test. The basic premise 
of the precautionary principle is to take cost effective measures 
to minimize or avoid harm in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.266 But, not all formulations of the precautionary 
principle are appropriate. The proper formulation of the 
precautionary approach that should be employed here is the 
balanced, risk-based, 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit approach. 
Although a preemptive precautionary approach may achieve 
complete environmental protection in ANWR, such a path 
veers away from the express legislative decision not to ban all 
oil development in the 1002 Area. Such an extreme approach 
indeed takes away the potentially great benefits of energy 
                                                        
262. Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
263. Knudsen, supra note 259, at 122 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
264. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16–18. 
265. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 2. 
266. Kannan, supra note 253, at 420. 
35
Tanus: Oil Development in ANWR: The Precautionary Principle Is Compatibl
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
2012] OIL DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR 365 
harvest from the Arctic. The balanced application of the 
precautionary principle tailors the response to the situation at 
issue. For example, in the European Union’s application of this 
approach “[the] response . . . developed [should] reflect[] 
‘proportionality between the measures taken and the chosen 
level of protection; non-discrimination in application . . . ; 
consistency . . . with . . . similar situations; examination of the 
benefits and costs . . . ; review of the measures in the light of 
scientific developments; [and] the burden of proof.’ 
[It] . . . stresses science and requires judgments based on 
individual risks.”267 
Three elements comprise the precautionary principle: “[1] 
fully assessing possible impacts of an action; [2] shifting the 
burden of proof to those whose activities pose a threat to the 
environment; and [3] not acting if there is significant 
uncertainty or risk of irreversible harm. The first two elements 
are procedural, and the third is substantive.”268 Applying these 
three elements, the FWS can make informed decisions about 
oil development in ANWR and fulfill both its overarching 
purpose of environmental protection and ANWR’s conservation 
mission. 
1. The FWS Should Evaluate the Full Suite of Potential 
Impacts From Oil Development in ANWR 
The first element of the precautionary principle requires 
evaluation of environmental impacts.269 This element promotes 
attentiveness to environmental consequences.270 The FWS 
compatibility test is an actual application of this element. In 
its Refuge Manual, the FWS requires its refuge managers to 
identify and describe all reasonably anticipated impacts of the 
proposed use.271 They are directed to consider and use 
“available sources of information, including planning 
                                                        
267. Id. at 419 (citing Activities of the European Union: The Precautionary Principle, 
EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (summarizing a February 2000 communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities on the precautionary principle)). 
268. Kannan, supra note 253, at 422–23. 
269. Id. 
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documents, environmental assessments, environmental impact 
statements, annual narrative reports, information from 
previously conducted or ongoing research, data from refuge 
inventories or studies, published literature on related 
biological studies, state conservation management plans, field 
management experience and consultation with wildlife 
research professionals, state wildlife resource managers and 
industry professionals, etc.”272 
Moreover, refuge managers have to evaluate long-term and 
short-term impacts from the proposed use.273 The Refuge 
Manual cautions that a use may be expected to result in minor 
effects at the beginning, but over time these effects may turn 
into substantial adversities.274 Impacts may also be short in 
duration but highly damaging to the environment, or 
conversely, long in duration but with very minor effects.275 
There is a lack of large-scale synthesis of data addressing 
quantitative and cumulative effects of changes from oil 
development in the Arctic environment.276 As discussed above, 
the USGS team pinpointed several crucial elements that must 
be achieved prior to making decisions about oil development in 
the Arctic.277 The FWS, by law and its own regulations, is 
required to assess the full suite of impacts when considering a 
proposed use. If the FWS follows a precautionary model when 
there is insufficient information, as is the case with ANWR’s 
1002 Area, the FWS should direct its refuge managers to deny 
oil development as a proposed use.278 
2. The FWS Should Demand Proof of Compatibility from 
Proposers of Oil Development 
The second element of the precautionary principle deals 
with who has the burden of proof and what level of proof is 
required.279 A balanced precautionary principle accommodates 
the goals of compatibility; consideration of the action within 
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the actual context should guide how the second element is to 
be applied. 
Oil development in ANWR has the potential for 
irretrievable, materially adverse consequences to the 
environment on a large scale.280 Oil spill risk and response 
strategies in the harsh, yet fragile Arctic setting lack evidence 
of proven success acceptable by a majority of stakeholders.281 
Because of the potential for extreme environmental injury and 
uncertainties in adaptive management, a correspondingly high 
level of proof showing adequate environmental protections 
should be demanded. The burden of proof to show expected 
environmental impacts from oil development should be on the 
proponent’s shoulders. This showing must be supported by 
evidence of reasonable scientific certainty accepted by the 
general stakeholders’ community. Adaptive management 
plans, including accountability for oil spill risk and response, 
must also be confirmed by evidence of scientific certainty when 
enacted in the real life conditions of ANWR. 
Consistent with the precautionary principle, the FWS’s 
compatibility test places the burden of proof on the proposer of 
the action:282  
 [C]ompatibility . . . is a threshold issue, and the 
proponent(s) of any use or combination of uses must 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the refuge manager 
that the proposed use(s) pass this threshold test. The 
burden of proof is on the proponent to show that they 
pass; not on the refuge manager to show they 
surpass.283  
The compatibility test also addresses the potential for 
significant environmental damage from oil development by 
requiring refuge-specific analysis.284 Like the precautionary 
principle’s reasonable scientific certainty requirement, FWS 
refuge managers are required to base their evaluations on 
reasonably anticipated impacts on refuge resources.285 
For proposed oil development in the 1002 Area, refuge 
                                                        
280. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16–18. 
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285. Id. at 13. 
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managers should consider impacts to all of ANWR’s ecological 
resources, including, for example, the porcupine caribou herd. 
FWS refuge managers may look at planning documents, 
environmental assessments, and other previously conducted or 
ongoing research and studies286 from comparable locations, 
such as the USGS report287 or the biological studies of the 
central caribou herd condition in light of its migration through 
the Prudhoe Bay oil fields.288 The 1987 FLEIS findings, though 
from many years ago, and the FWS’s own documented 
knowledge also provide a pertinent basis for the refuge 
manager’s examination. In the porcupine caribou case, 
although these sources of information may be reasonable, they 
provide opposing viewpoints on oil development’s impacts to 
this species and cannot be said to be generally accepted by the 
stakeholder community. Therefore, to begin the compatibility 
test, proposers of oil development in the 1002 Area must make 
available comprehensive and cumulative information on 
potential environmental impacts from oil development. This 
includes, for instance, the possible impact on the porcupine 
caribou if oil pipelines, roads and structures are built on the 
herd’s calving grounds, as drawn from reasonable, generally 
accepted scientific data. The refuge manager needs this type 
and level of information to properly administer ANWR’s 
ecological resources and implement its mission of conservation. 
Without this information, FWS refuge managers cannot make 
an affirmative finding of compatibility and must not permit oil 
development in ANWR.289 
3. The FWS Must Prohibit Oil Development in ANWR if 
Faced with Insufficient Scientific Information 
The third element of the precautionary principle bars the 
proposed action from occurring when there is substantial 
uncertainty or risk of irretrievable harm.290 Elasticity is built 
into interpretations of “substantial uncertainty,” “substantial 
risk,” and “irretrievable harm.”291 For this present case, much 
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287. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, passim. 
288. See Deborah Jacobs, The Caribou Question, PERC REPORTS, June 2001, at 3, 
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can be argued as to the whether the oil development in ANWR 
meets the threshold of any or all of these categories. The USGS 
report that consulted over 400 sources of information readily 
admitted difficulty in “determining what is a ‘science gap’ or 
what is ‘sufficient science.’”292 Tasked with summarizing 
existing information, the USGS team identified many major 
gaps in scientific knowledge, including insufficient information 
for “effective oil-spill risk assessment, preparedness, and 
response” despite the “significant advances in spill-risk 
evaluation and response knowledge.”293 
Technological innovations have arguably lessened the 
footprints of oil development.294 Oil companies continue to act 
preemptively in their research efforts to meet their 
legislatively and self-imposed missions to act carefully and 
responsibly.295 Therefore, the risk of catastrophic disaster may 
be slight. However, given the history of injuries from oil 
development, little argument can reasonably be offered to 
assert that damages from oil development are only temporary 
or easily repairable. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez 
supertanker on March 24, 1989 released eleven million gallons 
of crude oil into one of this world’s most fragile and amazing 
marine environments, causing an oil slick of over 500 miles 
and damaging 1300 miles of shoreline.296 The cleanup cost over 
two billion dollars, while the livelihood, social, and cultural 
fabrics of fishing and Native communities were torn apart.297 
Twenty years after the spill, the Pacific herring and the Pigeon 
Guillemot are identified as species that have “not recovered,” 
meaning they show little or no signs of improvement.298 As a 
result of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
on April 20, 2010, BP paid out an additional $7.8 billion on top 
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http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/2009%20Status
%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf) [hereinafter TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT]; see also 
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of the $7.5 billion it already spent to further compensate the 
thousands of people injured and damage to the environment.299 
An oil spill in the 1002 Area would likely devastate ANWR’s 
delicate ecosystem richly filled with wildlife and migratory 
birds, including the porcupine caribou herd, polar bears, musk 
oxen, eagles, snow geese, and many others, and which supports 
Native people’s subsistence uses. 
Even without an oil spill, oil development has significant 
impacts on the environment. According to the USGS, oil 
reserves in the 1002 Area may be located in small 
accumulations throughout the 1002 Area, in contrast to 
Prudhoe Bay’s single large oil field.300 The nearest pipeline 
would be more than 30 miles away and the nearest gravel road 
and oil support facilities more than 50 miles away, requiring 
many production sites connected by even greater number of 
infrastructure build-outs.301 The FWS expects adverse 
cumulative impacts on biological life in the refuge as the result 
of oil development.302 For the porcupine caribou, oil 
development will potentially reduce the quality and quantity of 
food and habitat available during the herd’s calving season.303 
The FWS predicts that a reduction in annual calf survival of 
just five percent would cause a decline in the porcupine 
caribou population.304 
When evaluating proposed oil development in ANWR, the 
FWS should recognize the precautionary principle within its 
own statute and regulations. The FWS is tasked to consider 
complex factors of environmental risks while understandably 
distracted by economic, political, and Native concerns. The 
FWS must demand sufficient information to perform a true 
compatibility test. Accordingly, given the current state of 
scientific knowledge and consistent with the precautionary 
principle, the FWS should deny a proposal to initiate oil 
development in ANWR. 
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VIII.CONCLUSION 
When evaluating proposed oil development in ANWR’s 1002 
Area, the FWS should follow the precautionary principle in 
order to conform to the stated and implied goals of the 
management of ANWR, the conservation purpose of the 
System, and the agency’s own mission to protect human health 
and the environment. The precautionary principle, already 
embedded in FWS compatibility statute and regulations, 
assists the decision makers by demanding the requisite 
amount of time and assignment of efforts to obtain the 
appropriate level of certainty and knowledge. In addition, the 
precautionary principle obligates the proposer of the actions to 
be responsible for disproving the action’s harm or potential 
harm on the environment. Until sufficient information 
demonstrates oil development’s compatibility with ecological 
conservation, as its own regulations require,305 the FWS must 
proceed with caution and prohibit oil development in ANWR’s 
1002 Area. 
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